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 The financial crisis of the late 2000s generated a global recession one aspect of 
which was declines in international private capital flows, including those from developed 
to underdeveloped countries.  The fiscal stress in developed countries generated by the 
recession provoked speculation that the fall in private flows might be accompanied by 
reduction in official development assistance.  These changes in the tempo and pattern of 
capital flows could have major implications for growth in the sub-Saharan region.  They 
also raise the issue of capital account management to high on the policy agenda. 
 In mainstream ("neoclassical") economic analysis an international regime of 
unregulated currency movements facilitates capital inflow, which can contribute to 
funding investment and faster growth.  In practice the absence of regulation also allows 
for the unrequited outflow of foreign exchange, capital flight.  The focus of this paper is 
the probable impact of capital flows, including capital flight, on the macroeconomic 
performance of sub-Saharan countries over several decades leading up to the global 
financial crisis.   
 The empirical evidence is on 31 countries included in the Boyce and Ndikumana 
database (Ndikumana and Boyce 2010).  Inspection of the statistics strongly suggests that 
in the absence of effective regulation of the external account, as is the case in most of the 
sub-Saharan countries, capital flight is quite substantial, absolutely and compared to other 
types of resource flows.  Capital flight plus official debt service outweigh positive flows 
in many countries, development assistance and direct foreign investment.  The 
comparison of inflows and outflows leads to the conclusion that the impact of capital 
flows on sub-Saharan countries has been exaggerated. 
                                                 
1 The author thanks James Boyce and Léonce Ndikumana of the University of Massachusetts for their 
comments and for providing the data on capital flight. 
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 The evidence suggests that loss of foreign exchange through debt service and 
capital flight may in part explain the relatively weak growth of the countries of the sub-
Saharan region.  In the 2000s the outflows from debt service declined for most countries 
as a consequence of long-delayed debt relief, which contributed to improved growth 
performances in the years before the global financial crisis.  National measures to limit 
capital flight would result in further improvement in economic performance. 
 
Analytical Framework 
 The analysis of the impact of capital flows on economic performance requires an 
explicit theoretical framework in which to assess the various components.  With very few 
exceptions, investment goods are not produced in sub-Saharan countries, and must be 
imported.  Therefore, foreign exchange flows from all sources represent an essential 
element in growth performance.  Following the Harrod-Domar tradition, the investment 
rate is considered the most important economic determinant of growth of capacity in the 
medium term.   
 With this framework, the growth rate identity can be transformed into a 
behavioral relationship.  If Y is national income and K is the capital stock, then the 
potential rate of growth can be expressed as follows:  
 g = Y/Y = [Y/Y][K/K] = [K/Y]/[K/Y]    (1) 
g = [I/Y]/k = /k, 0<<1, 0<k<1  (2) 
 The term k is the incremental capital and  is the investment share in national 
income.  For example, if net investment is twenty percent of national income and the 
output-capital ratio is four, the potential rate of growth is five percent.  Whether that rate 
is achieved depends on the sum of the components of exogenous demand, investment 
itself, public expenditure and the external (export) component.  The import-dependency 
of investment is specified as a simple linear relationship, with z the capacity to import, 
defined as the ex-post import share (z = Z/Y): 
   = az         (3) 
 The capacity to import is the sum of export revenue and other foreign exchange 
flows.  As shown in the empirical discussion, in many sub-Saharan countries the most 
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important components of the other flows are official development assistance and direct 
foreign investment on the positive side, and debt service and capital flight on the 
negative.  There are a few exceptions to this generalization, the most obvious being the 
large but declining workers' remittances into Swaziland.  Because of poor quality of the 
data for a majority of the countries in this study, remittances are not included as a 
separate item.  For the thirty-one countries the capital flight variable includes unrecorded 
remittances (Ndikumana and Boyce 2011, 42-45, 52-53). 
 Each major component of the capacity to import has its own behavioral 
characteristics.  Development assistance reflects an administrative decision strongly 
influenced by the political interests of donors and lenders, while for the current period 
loan agreements in previous years determine debt service obligations.  Foreign direct 
investment in the region is overwhelmingly focused on extraction, especially petroleum.  
When one excludes foreign investment in mining and petroleum, FDI was about two 
percent of national income during 1980-2010. To place this statistic in perspective, for a 
capital-output ratio of four, net investment of two percent of GDP implies a capacity 
increasing effect of one-half of one percent per annum (/k = 2/4 = 0.5 increase in 
potential growth).  The relatively low share for foreign investment places the burden for 
growth enhancing investment on the domestic private sector or the public sector. 
 These capital flow components plus exports imply that the capacity to import can 
be written as follows: 
 z =  px + a1(FDI) + a2(ODA) - [(DbSr] + (CpF)],     (4) 
where a1 & a2 are both less than one. p = unit dollar value of exports, x = export volume, 
FDI = foreign direct investment, ODA = official development assistance, DbSr = debt 
service, and CpF = capital flight, all as shares of national income. 
  
 By definition all revenue from exports can be used to import.  Part of direct 
investment is replacement and maintenance, with the net component indicated by the 
parameter a1.  The balance of payments flow associated with direct investment consists 
almost entirely of imports used in those investments.  With adjustment for depreciation, 
the entire flow contributes to capacity expansion, but very little of it is non-committed 
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foreign exchange.  Direct investment is, in effect, the private sector equivalent of "tied 
aid", though it should be entirely growth enhancing which development assistance is not. 
 Development assistance contains components of current and capital expenditure, 
with the latter directly enhancing of productive capacity.  The proportion of development 
assistance that can serve as uncommitted foreign exchange for discretionary investment 
by the public or private sector can be astoundingly low (UNCTAD 2000, Chapter 6).  
This derives from the explicit tying of aid, the share of assistance budgeted for technical 
assistance, and the non-tied import content of projects and programs that are not 
investment.  The coefficient a2 adjusts development assistance to include only foreign 
exchange flows that in practice enter the recipient country.   
 It is unfortunately the case that in our empirical work it was not possible to obtain 
data to estimate the two coefficients that was not arbitrary.  The implicit treatment of the 
coefficients as equal to unity involves a substantial overestimate of capital inflow.  An 
important research task for the future is to estimate these coefficients at the country level, 
especially for development assistance whose actual inflow is frequently substantially less 
than the nominal. 
 The asymmetry between the two major inflows and outflows are extremely 
important.  For national growth and development, capital flight and debt service are dead-
weight losses.  They are unrequited transfers with no benefit direct or indirect on 
consumption or investment.  In contrast, most of direct investment enhances growth in 
the primary sector with few spread effects, with its net balance of payments contribution 
close to zero. Development assistance may fund essential goods and services, though its 
net balance of payments contribution may be low, except when explicitly designed 
otherwise.   
 In post-conflict circumstances development assistance carries a large component 
of uncommitted foreign exchange, in order to fund basic imports until the war-affected 
export economy revives.  Sierra Leone in the 2000s provides a clear example, with a 
trade deficit of over fifteen percent of GDP during 2001-2003, and a even larger fiscal 
deficit.  During these years development assistance was larger than the sum of the two 
deficits, covering import requirements and public expenditure until the economy began to 
recover.  A substantial portion of this development assistance must have funded capital 
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flight, which accounted for an additional annual outflow of twenty percent of GDP in 
these years.2 
 With these comments, foreign exchange availability (equation 4) can be defined 
in terms of exports, inflows and outflows: 
 non-export inflow (NXI) = [a1(FDI) + a2(ODA)]    (5) 
 non-import outflow (NZI) = [(DbSr] + (CpF)]    (6) 
 z = x + [NZI] + [NXI]        (7) 
 This treatment ignores the possibility of interaction between inflows and outflows. 
Interaction between development assistance and capital flight is a likely possibility, 
especially if, as in a number of countries in the region, donors deposit their assistance into 
commercial banks rather than directly into the central bank.  This practice by donors 
substantially facilitates the corruption they frequently condemn.  The non-trade elements 
can also be treated as "private" and "official".  Capital flight is perpetrated by individuals, 
including public officials (Ndikumana and Boyce 2011, Chapter 3, "The revolving 
Door").  Therefore, capital flight plus foreign direct investment can be designated as "net 
private flows".   
 In the sub-Saharan region most of the public foreign debt is owed to official 
lenders (governments, Bretton Woods institutions and regional development banks), if 
not initially converted into official debt subsequently.3  For this reason government debt 
service payments can be combined with official development assistance to yield "net 
official flows".  The latter concept is especially appropriate because a substantial portion 
of "development assistance" involved explicit recycling of funds to official donors and 
lenders to cover debt payments.   
 In the 1990s and into the 2000s prior to general debt relief, this recycling 
amounted to de facto debt rescheduling when lenders, most notably the IMF and the 
World Bank, formally refused to rescheduling or reduction of government debt.   The de 
facto recycling of "assistance" into debt service involved the international financial 
institutions in a process analogous to private bank replenishing of reserves in face of non-
                                                 
2 For an analytical discussion of capital flight and development assistance, see Ndikumana and 
Boyce (2011, 66-67). 
3 The Zambian public debt is an example of this conversion (Weeks, et. al., Chapters 2 and 6). 
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performing loans.  The governments of several countries, including ones with absolutely 
large debts such as Zambia, found themselves on the verge of default.  First, the 
international financial institutions facilitated the conversion of private debts to 
multilateral ones, then postponed default by the assistance-to-debt-service mechanism.  
This recycling culminated in the long and drawn out Highly Indebted Poor Countries 
(HIPC) scheme, and the generalized debt forgiveness just before the financial crisis. 
 The calculation of net private flows measures the extent to which capital flight 
quantitatively offsets foreign direct investment, and net public flows measures the extent 
to which debt service offsets development assistance.  These calculations make a step 
towards assessing the contribution of external flows to development.  The flow equations 
can be re-written as follows: 
 net private flow (NPF) = [a1(FDI) + (CpF)]     (8) 
 net official flow (NOF) = [(DbSr] + + a2(ODA)]    (9) 
 And, by definition, 
 NPF + NOF = NZI + NXI       (10) 
 In the next section the available statistics are inspected to assess the relative 
importance of the four categories of financial flows, development assistance, direct 
investment, debt service and capital flight.   
 
Macroeconomic Performance and Financial Flows 
 Overview of Capital Flows, 1980-2011 
 The sub-Saharan countries receive substantially less private capital flow than the 
other developing regions.  This is the case for portfolio flows because no country except 
South Africa has a developed capital market.  South Africa also has the only substantial 
domestic market, implying limited opportunities in the other countries for direct 
investment except for resource extraction (which is also important in South Africa). 
 Figure 1 provides statistics on private capital flows to all countries of the region, 
divided among direct investment, portfolio and other flows.  In contrast to direct 
investment, portfolio and other flows show extreme volatility.  In addition, these two 
types of flows were severely effected by the global recession.  During the 1990s, the 
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aggregate non-FDI inflow to the region was US$ 19 billion at prices of 2008,4 falling to a 
negative 49 billion for 2000-2007, and that negative flow almost doubled to 94 billion for 
the next four years.  Direct investment was a positive US$ 118 during 2000-2007, hardly 
changed for the next four years (US$ 116 billion).  The dramatic difference in behavior 
between FDI and non-FDI flows makes a strong circumstantial argument for regulation 
of short term capital flows. 
 The pattern of official flows is quite different for official development assistance 
as such and net official flows (Figure 2).  The former, taken from the World Bank (World 
Development Indicators) and using the OECD definition of official assistance, increased 
continuously in constant prices from its low point in 2000 (US$ 15 billion in prices of 
2008, lowest total since 1984).  The movement of net official flows, which includes debt 
servicing, was a negative US$ 42 billion over the eight years 2000-2007.  The cancelling 
of most sub-Saharan official debt, especially that due to the IMF and World Bank, led to 
a dramatic shift to a positive net flow of US$ 80 billion during 2008-2011. 
 The rest of this paper seeks to disaggregate the private flows at the national level 
for thirty-one sub-Saharan countries.  As noted the financial structure in most countries of 
the region is underdeveloped and in some cases non-existent.  As a result, non-FDI flows 
fall overwhelmingly into the category of capital flight, in the sense that they are unrelated 
to any domestic financial asset at any stage of their life cycle.  
 
 Categorizing Countries 
 Table 1 provides the statistics with the countries divided into three groups: oil 
exporters, post-conflict, and others. The list of the countries is provided in Table 2 and 
Table 3.  The tables report growth rates, investment shares and capital flows during 
twenty-nine years, 1980-2008, which are covered by the Ndikumana and Boyce statistics 
on capital flight.  The country level statistics are provided for reference, because the 
analysis will refer to groups of countries.  This is to avoid an excessively detailed 
discussion, while providing the disaggregated data for those who might be interested in 
further exploration of the categorization of the countries into groups.  
                                                 
4 The 2008 base year is chosen because it corresponds to that used by Ndikumana and Boyce. 
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 The thirty-one countries are divided into three groups, those exporting petroleum, 
those conflict-affected, and those that neither export petroleum nor suffer from conflict, 
which is designated the "other" group.  A consensus exists that an export sector 
dominated by petroleum and conflict affect macroeconomic performance.  The difficulty 
arises in assigning countries to these categories in an exclusive and non-arbitrary manner.  
For the petroleum exporting group arbitrariness arises if a country qualifies for the group 
for only a part of the time period, either because of recent discovery or substantial decline 
in production.  Among the thirty-one countries in our data set this is not a major problem.  
More serious might be the objection that some mineral producers, Botswana for example, 
have macroeconomic characteristics similar to petroleum exporters.  We have taken a 
"minimalist" approach, adhering strictly to the petroleum category and including only 
those whose exports have been oil dominated for over a decade:  Angola, Cameroon, 
Chad, Republic of Congo, Gabon, Nigeria and Sudan. 
 The "conflict-affected" category presents substantially greater problems both 
analytically and practically.  Because few countries of the world are free from conflict, 
distinctions must be made on the basis of degree.  Applying this criterion to the thirty-one 
countries over the years 1980-2008, few would object to the inclusion of Burundi, 
Democratic Republic of Congo, Rwanda and Sierra Leone.  We also include Ethiopia, 
whose internal conflict lasted throughout the 1980s, formally ending with Eritrean 
independence and a new government in Addis Ababa in 1991.  In subsequent years the 
ebb and flow of tensions between the two countries resulted in armed hostilities during 
1998-2000.  We also include Zimbabwe, which might be questioned because unlike the 
other four, its conflicts have not involved war by usual definitions.   
A more serious categorical objection is that at least two of the petroleum 
exporting countries unambiguously qualify as conflict-affected by any rational definition, 
Angola and Sudan.  We judge that for the analysis of capital flows, petroleum exporting 
status takes priority over conflict status.  Finally, arguments could be made to include at 
least three other countries, Cote d'Ivoire (civil war during 2002-2007, rekindled in 2011), 
South Africa (anti-apartheid conflict until the early 1990s), and Uganda (civil war until 
about 1985, conflict in the north since the late 1980s).  We omit Cote d'Ivoire because its 
conflict affects less than a third of the years we cover.  We judge the economic effects of 
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the conflict in South Africa were not sufficiently substantial for inclusion, though the 
human cost of apartheid was enormous beyond measurement.  We exclude Uganda for 
the same reason as Cote d'Ivoire, as the substantial economic impact of its conflict lasted 
less than a third of the time period under review. 
 
Growth and Investment 
We can now inspect the indicators in Table 1a.  As one would expect, the group 
of conflict-affected countries had the lowest rate of economic growth in every decade, 
twenty years of declining per capita income followed by weak recovery slightly above 
population increase.  The growth rates for the petrol exporters and the group of other 
countries were very close on average for the three decades as a whole, but the former 
more variable than the latter.  Much of the greater variation results from the swings in 
world petroleum prices. Also as should be expected, the share of gross investment in 
GDP is greatest for the petroleum exporting countries and least for the conflict affected 
group.  The most important inference from the investment statistics is how low they are.  
If the typical aggregate net capital-out ratio for sub-Saharan countries is about four, the 
gross would be close to five, yielding a potential growth rate of slightly above four 
percent for petroleum exporters and slightly below for the group of other countries.  
These rates, close to the actual ones for the three decades, imply quite modest per capita 
growth, requiring fifty years to double. 
The three-year moving average growth rates for the countries groups are shown in 
Figure 3, and this highlights the greater variability among the petroleum exporting 
countries.  The chart clearly demonstrates that while petroleum prices and conflict 
account for poor growth performance in the first half of the 1990s, this was a period of 
slow growth for the entire region.  Figure 4 supports our working hypothesis that the 
share of investment in GDP is the major driver of the potential rate of growth in the 
region.  The simple regression of growth and the investment rate proves significant and of 
the predicted sign.5  A full specification of the interaction would require variables to 
capture aggregate demand effects that drag the actual rate of growth below the potential 
                                                 
5 In a simple regression, the R-square, the F and the standard error of the variable are strictly 
related.  The first two are both provided for the readers' convenience. 
 10
rate.  Support for this hypothesis becomes relevant below, when we link the investment 
rate to capital flows. 
 
Capital Flows 
Figure 5 provides a closer look at capital flight, again applying a three-year 
moving average.  The variable is negative for each group and every observation except 
one (for the “other” country category is marginally positive at 0.1 for 2001).  From the 
end of the 1980s to 2000-2001, capital flight shows a declining trend for the seventeen 
"other" countries, and also for the petroleum exporters, though for that group the 
tendency is weaker.  This trend was sharply reversed after the early 2000s for each group, 
a reversal that pre-dated the Global Financial Crisis by at least five years.  The increase in 
capital flight is all the more striking when we inspect the variable for the conflict affected 
group.  The conflicts in five of the seven countries in the group ended or became less 
intense as the 2000s proceeded (Burundi, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Rwanda and Sierra 
Leone) and in a fifth was no worse (Democratic Republic of Congo).  Despite this, capital 
flight across the seven countries in the mid-to-late 2000s was the greatest throughout the 
three decades both absolutely and as a portion of GDP (also the case for the petroleum 
exporters).   
The other major non-trade element of external outflow, debt service, is reported in 
Figure 6.  The absolute and relative burden of debt service increased into the early 1990s, 
then began an almost continuously positive trend.  When the two major outflows are 
combined (Figure 7), there appears to be an improvement for the 2000s in total outflow 
for the 17 "other" countries.  No improvement occurs for the conflict-affected countries 
compared to the level of the early 1980s, though the upward trend since the mid-2000s 
may continue.  The pattern for the petroleum producers is much the same as for the 
conflict group, though the level of capital outflow is higher (less negative) for every year.  
The overall impression given by Figure 7 is the similarity of the patterns for the three 
country groups.  As suggested above, this similarity suggests underlying forces common 
to the three groups, with the intra-group characteristics determining level rather than 
pattern of capital outflows.  
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Having reviewed the outflows, we turn to the inflows, foreign direct investment 
(Figure 8) and official development assistance (Figure 9).  The statistics on direct 
investment indicate a positive trend since the 1980s in all three groups of countries, 
though the petroleum exporters, recipients of the largest amounts, suffered a sharp 
decline in the second half of the 2000s.  Direct investment is far less than capital flight 
for all three groups.  This is especially the case for the petroleum exporters, who received 
the largest inflows and the largest outflows (plus 3.4 percent of GDP and minus 6.0 
percent, respectively).  As noted above, it is not possible to assess what part of the upper 
trend in direct investment is mergers and acquisitions. 
The upward trend in direct investment contrasts with the results for official 
development assistance (Figure 9).  For the average share of ODA in GDP across all 
thirty-one countries for the three decades we find no significant trend, nor for any group.  
If we split the time series at the mid-point, the means for the two periods for the two non-
conflict groups are not significantly different, slightly lower since 1995 for the group of 
17 other countries and slightly higher for the petroleum exporters.  The pattern for the 
conflict countries is one of extremes, reflecting the large inflows that come after the end 
of hostilities.   
The last time series chart, Figure 10, combines inflow and outflow to obtain net 
flow.  The sum across direct investment, development assistance, debt service and capital 
flight produces positive values for all years but one for the group of seventeen non-
conflict countries that do not export petroleum.  From that negative value for 1978, one 
finds an almost continuously upward movement.  However, a statistically significant 
positive trend depends entirely on the inclusion of 1987-1995.  From 1995 onwards the 
pattern appears as cyclical.  The pattern for conflict countries also appears cyclical, with 
only the petroleum exporters claiming a relatively long, unambiguously upward 
tendency, for 1982-2004, followed by a sharp decline. 
In assessing the net capital flow statistics we must recall that only part of 
development assistance enters the recipient country.  Leakage occurs due to the fore-
mentioned recycling of ODA into debt service and payments directly to donor country 
suppliers that involve no material input, such as technical assistance and consultancy 
fees.  If over the three decades across countries leakages had averaged a modest twenty-
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five percent of gross aid, the net capital flow as portion of GDP for the thirty-one 
countries would have been zero.  While ODA, FDI and net debt flows are well measured, 
capital flight is likely to be underestimated. Therefore, it is probable that net flows were 
considerably less than estimated in this study. 
This review of the major flows of funds produces the following conclusions for 
the twenty-nine years 1980-2008: 
1. capital flight appears strongly cyclical for all three country groups, with a 
striking reduction in the early 2000s that was reversed during the following years; 
2. debt service declined continuously from the mid-1990s, though prior to debt 
relief in the 2000s the measured decline may overstate the actual because of debt 
recycling through development assistance; 
3. direct foreign investment exhibits an upward trend for all three country groups, 
though for all of them it is substantially less than capital flight; 
4. official development assistance shows much the same pattern for the petroleum 
exporters and the group of 17 countries, upward movement until the mid-1990s, 
then stagnation or decline, while for the conflict group development assistance 
has extreme peaks and troughs. 
To summarize succinctly, on average across all thirty-one countries, over 1970-
2008, total capital flight was greater than total ODA.  This left the relatively small direct 
investment, contributing a bit over two percent of GDP as a positive element in external 
flows. 
 
 Capital Flows and Investment 
 The focus on capital flows is prompted by their probable impact on investment 
and via investment on growth.  Figure 4 suggests that the link between investment and 
growth is valid.  In this section we consider the apparent impact of net capital flow on 
investment rates for the three groups of countries. 
 Prior to presenting the simple hypothesis test in Figures 11-13 it should be noted 
that the relationship between capital flows  and investment shares is mediated by several 
mechanisms.  During the 1980s the growth rates of most sub-Saharan countries were 
below potential rates, including those covered in this study.  This was especially the case 
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for the petroleum exporters and conflict affected countries (see Figure 5).  Private 
investment is made to increase capacity in anticipation of growth approaching potential 
output levels.  When growth rates are low, the growth and investment link is weakened 
by excess capacity.  It follows that private investment rates were also low in the 1980s.  
Public investment rates in the sub-Saharan region were also low, in direct consequence of 
stabilization and structural adjustment programs that placed emphasis on reductions in 
fiscal deficits.   
 The differences in results for the 1980s and the following two decades are 
manifested in three scatter diagrams showing the relationship between net capital flow 
and gross investment rates by country group.  For the petroleum exporters there is no 
apparent relationship between the two variables for the 1980s, which closely 
approximates a vertical line (Figure 11).  From 1990 onwards the apparent interaction is 
quite clear and statistically significant, with the investment rate rising with net capital 
flow.  For the conflict affected countries the interaction is considerably weaker, though 
significant statistically for 1993-2008 (Figure 12).  For these countries the link between 
capital flows and investment is via development assistance funding public expenditures.  
In the case of the group of seventeen other countries, the investment and net capital flow 
hypothesis is not rejected for the period as a whole (Figure 13). 
 While more formal and rigorous statistical analysis is required, we conclude that 
the evidence is consistent with the analytical inference that capital flow has a substantial 
impact on investment and, therefore, growth.  This conclusion highlights the pernicious 
effect of capital flight, which for every group was greater than direct investment.  Capital 
flight exceed direct investment in twenty-nine of the thirty-one countries, the exceptions 
being Botswana and Swaziland. 
 
Conclusion and Policy Measures 
 Reduction of capital flight is essential to increase the resources available in sub-
Saharan countries for both consumption and investment, public and private.  With 
development assistance apparently in decline as a proportion of recipient national 
income, stemming capital flight may be the most important growth generating policy 
available to governments of sub-Saharan countries. 
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 Part of the task of reducing of capital flight lies with the governments of 
developed countries (Ndikumana and Boyce 2011, Chapter 5).  Governments in the sub-
Saharan region can hope for but not rely on the implementation of effective measures by 
developed country governments.  Even if several major countries introduced effective 
measures, there would for the foreseeable future remain "off-shore" money centers 
beyond the reach of regulation.  
 Therefore, while pressing for effective action by external actors, sub-Saharan 
governments should individually and collectively pursue their own solutions.  The 
minimalist step is the existing practice of sub-Saharan governments to require all foreign 
exchange transactions be registered with the central bank in order to be legal.  Second 
and less minimalist, all businesses, donors and non-governmental organizations could be 
required to channel their foreign exchange through the central bank.  While this measure 
need not in itself involve currency controls, it lays the basis for such controls if necessary.  
Third, the governments could legally require their citizens to provide details of foreign 
bank accounts they hold, a policy practiced in several European countries into the 1970s 
and reinforced in the United States recently. 
 Finally, sub-Saharan governments could consider a measure implemented in 
Argentina in recent years with great effectiveness.  In Argentina, any person, company or 
institution wishing to send abroad funds more than a specified minimum must provide the 
central bank with proof that the appropriate taxes have been paid on the income 
generating the funds to be remitted.  The burden of proof falls on the person or company 
seeking to export funds, to demonstrate either that the funds were exempt from tax or that 
the tax was paid.  This removes the administrative burden from governments.  In addition 
to its other virtues, this policy conforms to the global fight against the laundering of drug 
money. 
 Capital flight is a blight that has seriously undermined growth and development in 
the sub-Saharan region.  Though never eliminated, it is a blight that can be substantially 
reduced.  While governments in the sub-Saharan region await the uncertain process of 
reform in the developed world, there are effective measures they can take to reassert 
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Table 1a: GDP Growth Rate and the Gross Investment Share of GDP by Decade and Groups, 31 sub-Saharan Countries, 1980-2008 
 GDP growth rate   GInv/GDP 
 All Petrol Conflict Other All Petrol Conflict Other 
1980-89 3.2 3.7 2.6 3.2 18.7 22.2 14.2 19.2 
1990-99 2.4 2.0 -0.2 3.5 18.1 19.5 13.1 19.2 
2000-08 4.5 5.6 3.7 4.4 19.7 22.5 13.2 20.8 




Table 1b: Inflows and Outflows by Decade and Groups, 31 sub-Saharan Countries, 1980-2088 (percent of GDP) 
Variable: Foreign direct investment 
Official Development 
Assistance Debt Service   Capital Flight   Net flows   
Countries/dates 1980-9 1990-9 2000-8 1980-9 1990-9 2000-8 1980-9 1990-9 2000-8 1980-9 1990-9 2000-8 1980-9 1990-9 2000-8 
Petrol Exporters 1.4 2.7 6.5 4.6 6.8 4.6 -6.2 -5.7 -7.1 -6.8 -5.3 -6.7 -7.1 -1.5 -2.6 
Conflict-affected -0.3 0.6 2.5 8.9 14.5 22.7 -3.3 -3.1 -3.8 -11.3 -10.0 -10.4 -6.0 2.0 11.0 
Other 1.0 2.3 4.0 12.2 15.4 10.7 -5.3 -2.9 -5.1 -4.7 -4.9 -3.2 3.2 9.9 6.3 
Average 0.8 2.0 4.3 9.9 13.3 11.6 -5.1 -3.6 -5.3 -6.5 -6.0 -5.4 -0.9 5.8 5.2 
     
Net 
private: [FDI + CpF] 
Net 
official: [ODA + DbSr]    
    Petrol exporters -5.5 -2.6 -.2 -1.7 1.1 -2.5    
    Conflict affected -11.6 -9.4 -7.9 5.6 11.4 18.9    
     Other -3.7 -2.6 .8 6.9 12.5 5.5    
     Average -5.6 -3.9 -1.1 4.7 9.7 6.3    
Notes to Table 1: 
 
Notes: 
Period averages for 1980-2008 except for Angola (from 1988), Burundi (1985), Cape Verde (from 1982), Ethiopia (from 1981), Guinea (from 1986), Mozambique 
(from 1982), Tanzania (1988), and Uganda (1982).  Earliest data in all cases set by capital fight estimates. 
GDP % is the annual growth rate of GDP. GInv/GDP is the ratio of gross investment to GDP. FDI is foreign direct investment, ODA is official development assistance, 
DbtSr is debt service, CpF is capital flight. 
InF/GDP = [FDI + ODA]GDP and OutF/GDP = [DbtSr + CpF], and Net flows = NtF/GDP = [InF - OutF]/GDP. See data appendix for details. 
Country groups: 
Petrol exporters (7): Angola, Cameroon, Chad, Republic of Congo, Gabon, Nigeria, Sudan. 
Conflict-affected (7): Burundi, Congo DR, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Zimbabwe. 
Non-conflict (17): Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Cote d'Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Mauritania, Malawi, 





Table 2: National Accounts and Balance of Payments Statistics, 31 sub-Saharan Countries, 1980-2008 
 National accounts Balance of payments (% of GDP)    
Country GDP % GInv/GDP FDI ODA DbtSr CpFlight InFlow OutFlow NetFlow 
Angola 5.5 15.2 7.7 5.7 -13.2 -8.4 13.4 -21.6 -8.1 
Botswana 7.2 29.2 3.5 4.1 -1.9 0.7 7.6 -1.2 6.4 
Burkina Faso 4.5 19.4 0.5 13.7 -1.4 -1.9 14.3 -3.4 10.9 
Burundi 1.0 12.1 0.1 26.1 -3.5 -23.5 26.3 -27.0 -0.7 
Cameroon 2.5 19.0 1.0 4.5 -4.7 -9.7 5.5 -14.4 -8.9 
Cape Verde 6.0 29.9 4.5 23.7 -2.6 -17.2 28.2 -19.9 8.4 
Cen Afr Rep. 1.0 10.4 0.9 12.4 -2.0 -4.8 13.3 -6.7 6.6 
Chad 5.5 16.9 4.8 12.2 -1.1 -1.8 17.0 -2.9 14.1 
Congo, DR -0.2 10.6 2.0 11.7 -3.4 -5.9 13.8 -9.3 4.4 
Congo, Rep. 4.0 27.6 6.1 8.0 -11.4 -9.6 14.0 -21.0 -7.0 
Cote d'Ivoire 0.9 12.7 1.3 4.8 -11.6 -6.6 6.0 -18.2 -12.1 
Ethiopia 4.4 18.2 2.4 9.9 -1.6 -6.6 12.3 -8.2 4.1 
Gabon 2.0 28.4 0.3 1.7 -7.8 -4.6 2.1 -12.4 -10.3 
Ghana 3.9 16.9 1.4 8.7 -4.9 -2.5 10.1 -7.4 2.7 
Guinea 3.9 19.0 1.8 9.9 -4.6 -2.5 11.7 -7.2 4.6 
Kenya 3.4 19.8 0.5 6.9 -6.8 -0.7 7.4 -7.5 -0.1 
Lesotho 3.3 19.0 7.8 10.4 -3.5 -3.6 18.2 -7.2 11.0 
Madagascar 1.9 15.2 1.5 11.7 -3.8 -4.1 13.2 -7.9 5.2 
Malawi 3.2 19.0 1.2 22.5 -5.7 -2.9 23.8 -8.6 15.1 
Mauritania 3.0 23.1 4.4 20.3 -8.1 -3.6 24.6 -11.7 12.9 
Mozambique 4.5 17.9 2.4 29.3 -2.8 -7.8 31.7 -10.7 21.0 
Nigeria 3.3 22.6 3.0 1.1 -6.8 -7.2 4.0 -14.0 -10.0 
Rwanda 4.3 15.8 0.6 20.3 -1.0 -4.4 20.9 -5.4 15.5 
Sierra Leone 2.1 10.4 0.5 20.1 -4.7 -12.3 20.5 -17.0 3.5 
South Africa 2.6 19.4 0.8 0.2 -2.7 -0.8 1.0 -3.4 -2.4 
Sudan 4.9 17.2 2.2 5.3 -1.2 -2.1 7.4 -3.3 4.1 
Swaziland 5.3 20.6 4.0 2.5 -1.8 -1.2 6.4 -2.9 3.5 
Tanzania 4.9 21.7 2.3 16.5 -2.6 -2.1 18.8 -4.7 14.1 
Uganda 5.9 15.0 2.3 12.2 -2.8 -5.6 14.4 -8.4 6.0 
Zambia 2.2 17.5 4.0 19.2 -11.2 -5.9 23.2 -17.1 6.1 
Zimbabwe 0.6 14.7 0.6 4.4 -5.8 -11.4 5.0 -17.3 -12.3 
Averages 3.5 18.5 2.5 11.6 -4.7 -5.9 14.1 -10.4 3.4 
Notes: 
GDP% is the annual percentage rate of GDP growth.  See Table 1 for other notes. 
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Table 3: Inflows and Outflows by Decade for 31 sub-Saharan Countries, 1980-2008 (percentage of GDP) 
Variable: Foreign direct investment 
Official development 
assistance Debt service   Capital flight   Net flows 
Countries 1980-9 1990-9 2000-8 1980-9 1990-9 2000-8 1980-9 1990-9 2000-8 1980-9 1990-9 2000-8 1980-9 1990-9 2000-8 
Angola 2.3 9.2 8.5 2.1 7.7 4.4 -3.4 -16.7 -15.7 -10.2 -9.4 -6.9 -9.3 -9.3 -9.7 
Botswana 4.6 0.2 5.8 8.5 2.4 1.2 -2.7 -0.8 -2.0 5.3 0.4 -4.1 15.7 2.2 0.9 
B'kina Faso 0.1 0.3 1.3 11.7 16.6 12.7 -1.4 -1.2 -1.9 -4.2 -5.1 4.1 6.2 10.6 16.2 
Burundi 0.1 0.1 0.2 16.8 19.7 38.5 -2.4 -4.6 -3.6 -18.7 -15.1 -35.5 -4.3 0.0 -0.4 
Cameroon 1.2 0.3 1.5 2.7 5.3 5.7 -5.5 -4.0 -4.9 -13.9 -14.7 0.5 -15.4 -13.1 2.7 
Cape Verde 0.5 2.6 7.8 34.7 26.8 15.5 -2.7 -3.0 -2.6 -17.8 -19.8 -13.8 14.6 6.7 6.9 
CAR 0.6 0.1 2.2 14.7 13.9 8.2 -2.4 -1.8 -1.6 -5.0 -7.6 -1.3 7.8 4.6 7.4 
Chad 1.1 1.5 12.6 12.5 15.0 8.8 -0.7 -1.4 -1.4 -2.2 -2.1 -1.1 10.7 13.0 19.0 
Congo, DR -0.1 0.1 6.5 5.1 4.2 27.6 -4.8 -4.0 -0.7 -6.3 -2.7 -9.0 -6.1 -2.5 24.4 
Congo, Rp 1.4 5.4 12.0 4.9 12.0 6.9 -16.6 -2.8 -11.9 -8.2 -4.0 -17.4 -18.6 10.6 -10.3 
Cote d'Iv 0.6 1.3 1.9 2.6 8.8 2.7 -16.7 -5.5 -12.3 -7.6 -7.7 -4.2 -21.2 -3.1 -11.9 
Ethiopia 0.1 1.3 3.0 5.5 9.7 14.5 -1.8 -1.3 -1.7 -10.2 -4.0 -5.9 -6.4 5.8 10.0 
Gabon 1.8 -2.3 1.6 2.2 2.3 0.5 -7.1 -9.3 -8.4 -2.1 -2.6 -9.5 -5.2 -11.9 -15.7 
Ghana 0.2 1.7 2.4 6.3 9.9 10.2 -5.1 -3.9 -6.1 -3.4 -2.0 -2.2 -2.0 5.6 4.3 
Guinea 0.6 0.6 3.7 12.1 11.0 7.8 -5.8 -4.6 -3.9 -9.4 -4.2 2.3 -2.6 2.8 9.9 
Kenya 0.4 0.6 0.6 7.8 8.6 4.0 -8.7 -3.4 -8.0 -0.8 -0.1 -1.3 -1.3 5.8 -4.7 
Lesotho 1.6 16.5 5.0 14.7 10.2 5.8 -2.2 -5.4 -3.9 -10.0 0.2 -0.9 4.1 21.5 6.0 
Mdgscar 0.2 0.6 4.0 8.8 13.2 13.2 -5.8 -1.8 -3.6 -1.0 -8.6 -2.6 2.2 3.3 11.0 
Malawi 0.6 0.8 2.3 18.0 27.0 21.6 -9.0 -2.5 -5.2 -2.4 -20.8 -8.4 7.2 4.4 10.3 
Mauritania 1.1 0.4 12.4 25.4 18.8 16.1 -10.7 -5.2 -8.4 -7.8 -0.8 1.3 8.1 13.3 21.4 
Moz'bique 0.1 2.5 4.9 13.4 46.1 26.5 -2.3 -1.6 -4.4 -3.1 -2.8 -1.4 8.0 44.2 25.7 
Nigeria 1.7 4.1 3.2 0.3 0.8 2.1 -8.4 -4.0 -7.2 -6.7 -5.4 -9.6 -13.0 -4.5 -11.5 
Rwanda 1.0 0.2 0.7 10.7 29.7 20.3 -0.8 -1.2 -1.3 -7.3 -3.9 -1.8 3.6 24.8 17.9 
Srr Leone -2.6 0.5 3.8 9.2 19.7 32.6 -4.4 -3.8 -6.7 -8.3 -20.6 -7.6 -6.2 -4.2 22.2 
S Africa 0.0 0.6 1.9 0.0 0.2 0.4 -0.2 -2.5 -3.1 -0.5 -0.6 -1.2 -0.7 -2.4 -2.0 
Sudan 0.1 0.8 6.1 7.2 4.4 4.1 -2.0 -1.4 -0.6 -4.5 0.9 -2.6 0.8 4.7 6.9 
Swaziland 4.5 4.6 2.6 0.6 3.2 1.7 -1.5 -1.7 -1.7 4.3 -2.5 -5.8 7.9 3.6 -3.1 
Tanzania 0.1 1.6 3.5 20.9 19.0 12.8 -3.7 -1.1 -3.6 -7.2 -2.0 -1.0 10.1 17.5 11.7 
Uganda 0.1 1.6 4.2 6.6 15.9 14.2 -3.8 -1.3 -3.0 -4.7 -2.4 -10.0 -1.9 13.9 5.3 
Zambia 1.7 4.2 6.3 13.6 26.5 17.4 -10.6 -5.8 -16.9 -8.9 -1.0 -8.0 -4.2 23.9 -1.2 
Zimbabwe -0.1 1.3 0.7 6.0 4.1 2.9 -5.3 -3.7 -9.1 -17.2 -13.7 -2.5 -16.6 -12.0 -8.0 
Averages 0.8 2.0 4.3 9.9 13.3 11.6 -5.1 -3.6 -5.3 -6.5 -6.0 -5.4 -0.9 5.8 5.2 
      no. of countries < zero: 29 28 27 17 9 11 
Notes: See Table 1. 
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Figure 1: Net private capital flows to all sub-Saharan countries, 1980-2011 
(billions of constant 2008 US dollars) 
 
Notes: FDI is direct foreign investment, PrPortf is private portfolio flows, 
and PrOther is other private flows.  The deflator is the US GDP price 
index. 
Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook 2012, data tables. 
 
 
Figure 2: Official flows to all sub-Saharan countries, 1980-2011 (billions of 
constant 2008 US dollars) 
 
Notes: Nt Off(IMF) is net official flows, and ODA(WB) is official development 
assistance. 
Sources: Net official flows is from IMF, World Economic Outlook 2012, 
























































Petrol exporters (7): Angola, Cameroon, Chad, Republic of Congo, Gabon, Nigeria, Sudan. 
Conflict-affected (7): Burundi, Congo DR, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, 
Zimbabwe. 
Non-conflict (17): Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Cote d'Ivoire, 
Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Mauritania, Malawi, Mozambique, South Africa, 
Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia. 
Numbers in legend are the averages for the entire period. 
 
Figure 4: GDP growth rates and gross investment/GDP, 31 sub-Saharan countries, 
1980-2008, (3 year moving average) 
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GDP Grw = -10.58 + .76Inv/GDP
R2 = .28, F = 9.62, DF = 25
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Figure 5: Capital Flight as share of GDP, 31 sub-Saharan Countries, 1980-2008 (3 
year moving average) 
 
Notes: See Figure 3. 
Numbers in legend are the averages for the entire period. 
 
 
Figure 6: Debt Service as share of GDP, 31 sub-Saharan Countries, 1980-2008 (3 
year moving average) 
 
Notes: See Figure 3. 
























































Figure 7: Capital Flight plus Debt Service as share of GDP, 31 sub-Saharan 
Countries, 1980-2008 (3 year moving average) 
 
Notes: See Figure 3. 
Numbers in legend are the averages for the entire period. 
 
 
Figure 8: Foreign Direct Investment as share of GDP, sub-Saharan Countries, 1980-
2008 (3 year moving average) 
 
Notes: See Figure 3. 























































Figure 9: Official Development Assistance as share of GDP, sub-Saharan Countries, 
1980-2008 (3 year moving average) 
 
Notes: See Figure 3. 
Numbers in legend are the averages for the entire period. 
 
Figure 10: Net Capital Flow as share of GDP, 31 sub-Saharan Countries, 1980-2008 
(3 year moving average) 
 
Notes: See Figure 3. 




















































Figure 11: Petroleum Exporters: Net capital flow (horizontal) and investment 
(vertical) as share of GDP, 1980-2008 (3 year moving average) 
 





























Inv = 22.09 + 1.01NCF
R2 = .70, F = 39.10, DF = 17
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Figure 12: Conflict-affected countries: Net capital flow (horizontal) and investment 
(vertical) as share of GDP, 1980-2008 (3 year moving average) 
 
Conflict-affected countries are: Burundi, Congo DR, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Rwanda, Sierra 
Leone, Zimbabwe.  
 
Figure 13: Non-Conflict-affected countries: Net capital flow (horizontal) & 




























Inv = 12.0 + .08NCF

























Inv = 18.39 + .22NCF




 The data used in this paper are explained below. 
 1. Capital flight 
 The capital flight numbers are the estimates from Ndikumana and Boyce (2001, 
2011, Chapter 2, especially Table 2.1; on deflation for constant prices, see page 45).  In 
addition to the direct export of funds, trade invoicing serves as a major vehicle for capital 
flight.   This is a balance of payments flow measure. The method of estimation is 
explained in detail in Ndkimana and Boyce (2010) and Boyce and Ndikumana (2011). 
 
 2. External Debt Service 
 Debt service is the sum of principal and interest on external debt.   This is also a 
balance of payments flow measure.  Source is World Development Indicators. 
 3. Foreign Direct Investment (net) 
 To quote from the World Bank web-based data bank, "Foreign direct investment 
is net inflows of investment to acquire a lasting management interest (10 percent or more 
of voting stock) in an enterprise operating in an economy other than that of the investor."  
The measure does not distinguish between investment in new capacity (so-called green-
field investment) and acquisitions.  Among the countries covered in this study the latter 
are minor except in South Africa.  This is a balance of payments flow measure.  Source is 
World Development Indicators.  It was not possible to separate the recurrent cost 
component (e.g., repair and maintenance). 
 4. Official Development Assistance 
 Official development assistance is the net disbursement of funds that qualify 
under the definition of ODA specified by the Organization of Economic Cooperation and 
Development.  This is a balance of payments flow measure.  Source is World 
Development Indicators.  It was not possible to estimate the portion of assistance 
representing actual foreign exchange inflow to the recipient country. 
 5. Gross Domestic Product 
 Gross domestic product is measured in constant dollars, converted at official 
exchange rates.  This is a national accounts category.  Source is World Development 
Indicators. 
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 6. Gross investment 
 Private and public expenditure that is capacity increasing:  plant and equipment, 
improvement of land and infrastructure.  This is a national accounts category.  Source is 
World Development Indicators. 
 
